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1 Introduction 
 
The National Credit Act1 aims to promote responsibility in the credit market by 
encouraging responsible borrowing, the avoidance of over-indebtedness and the 
fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers, to discourage reckless credit 
granting by credit providers and to regulate aspects of contractual default by 
consumers.2 It attempts to address over-indebtedness through the provision of debt 
relief, which is accessed by means of the mechanism of debt review. This 
mechanism is based on the principle of full satisfaction of the consumer's financial 
obligations, in that the consumer-debtor may, by way of debt review, eventually 
obtain a rescheduling of his/her credit agreement debt, either by voluntary 
rearrangement plan3 with all his/her credit providers or as ordered by a court.4 Such 
rescheduling by court entails rearrangement of the consumer-debtor's obligations by 
extending the period of the agreement and reducing the amount of each payment 
due accordingly, or postponing during a specified period the dates on which 
payments are due under the agreement, or a combination of both.5 Where the debt 
review process however reveals reckless credit, the consumer is also afforded 
various forms of debt relief depending on the type of reckless credit extended to 
him/her.6  It has already been pointed out in an earlier publication that the aim of the 
NCA is thus not to deal with those instances where a debtor is insolvent and/or 
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1  34 of 2005 (the NCA). 
2  S 3 NCA. 
3  S 86(7)(b) NCA. 
4  S 86(7)(c) NCA. 
5  S 86(7)(c)(ii)(aa)–(cc) NCA. 
6  S 80 NCA. See also Vessio 2009 TSAR 274; Stoop 2009 SA Merc LJ 365. 
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where he/she also has debts that do not qualify as credit agreements in terms of the 
NCA.7 
 
It should also be noted for the purposes of this discussion that the credit provider is 
compelled in terms of the NCA to comply with certain statutory formalities when 
attempting to enforce the credit agreement debt against a consumer.8 These novel 
measures inevitably affect ordinary debt enforcement provisions. One of the most 
important requirements introduced by the NCA in this regard is that a credit provider 
is obliged, as a required step prior to debt enforcement, to provide the consumer-
debtor with a Section 129(1)(a) notice in order to notify him/her about certain rights 
afforded by the NCA, inter alia, the right to approach a debt counsellor in order to 
resolve a dispute or agree on a plan to repay the credit agreement debt. The 
consumer thus has the opportunity first to seek assistance from a debt counsellor by 
proposing a debt repayment plan which, if agreed to by the credit provider, would in 
essence stay the debt enforcement procedure against him/her with regard to his/her 
credit agreement debt. 
 
Further, it must be noted that the NCA does not deal with the interrelationship 
between sequestration, either by way of voluntary surrender or compulsory 
sequestration, and debt review in any way. It could thus have been foreseen that the 
possible impact of the NCA on sequestration applications would have arisen sooner 
or later. 
 
In a recent judgment, Ex parte Ford,9 the court refused to grant a sequestration order 
following three applications for voluntary surrender where the bulk of the debt 
consisted of credit agreements regulated by the NCA. The fact that no proper 
consideration had been given in the context of debt-counselling to any other option 
beyond administered debt collection, such as the possibility of declaring the credit 
agreements to be reckless credit in terms of the NCA before applying for voluntary 
                                                 
7  Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 38 and 55. 
8  Ss 129–130 NCA. 
9  2009 3 SA 376 (WCC) and see the discussion thereof by Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 
and Scholtz et al Guide paras 2.4, 11.3.3.1 and 11.7. 
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surrender, played a significant role in the court's decision not to grant the 
sequestration order.10 
 
In a more recent judgment, Investec Bank Ltd v Mutemeri,11 the respondent-debtors, 
namely the consumers, opposed an application for compulsory sequestration. The 
basis of their opposition was that the application for debt review in terms of the NCA 
barred the applicant from proceeding with the application for compulsory 
sequestration since they argued that such an application amounted to debt 
enforcement. 
 
This discussion therefore considers the impact of the debt relief remedies and 
certain special provisions that apply to debt enforcement in the NCA on 
sequestration procedures provided for in the Insolvency Act12 in view of the above 
judgments. With reference to terminology used in this article, it must be pointed out 
that the NCA has its own terminology. The creditor is usually the credit provider and 
the debtor the consumer in terms of this Act. These terms will thus be used 
interchangeably except if it is clear from the context that the creditor or debtor is not 
a credit provider or consumer in a particular situation.  
 
2 Basic requirements for the granting of a sequestration order and the 
court's discretion in this regard 
 
2.1 General 
 
It is trite knowledge that sequestration applications may either be brought by the 
debtor on an ex parte basis through voluntary surrender, or by way of compulsory 
sequestration in an application with prior notice by a creditor. In both instances, the 
applicable civil procedure involved is a high court application by way of motion that 
must also comply with the relevant requirements of the Insolvency Act.13 
 
                                                 
10  Ex parte Ford para 16. 
11  2010 1 SA 265 (GSJ) – hereafter the Mutemeri case. 
12  24 of 1936. 
13  See in general Kunst et al Meskin Chps 2 and 3; Sharrock et al Hockly's Insolvency Law Chps 2 
and 3; Bertelsmann et al Mars Chps 3 and 5. 
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In the case of voluntary surrender the court has discretion to accept the voluntary 
surrender of a debtor's estate and grant a sequestration order if it is satisfied that:14 
(a) The debtor is insolvent; 
(b) There is sufficient free residue to defray the costs of sequestration; 
(c) It will be to the advantage of creditors; and 
(d) The formalities in Section 4 of the Insolvency Act have been complied 
with. 
 
The onus of proving that these requirements have been met rests upon the debtor. 
 
Similarly, in the case of compulsory sequestration the court also has discretion to 
grant an application for the sequestration of a debtor's estate if it is satisfied that:15 
(a) The applicant is a creditor (or his agent) who has a liquidated claim 
against the debtor for not less than R100 or two or more creditors (or 
their agents) who have liquidated claims against the debtor amounting, 
in aggregate, to not less than R200;16 
(b) The debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent;17 
(c) There is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors of 
the debtor if his estate is sequestrated;18 and 
(d) The formalities in section 9 of the Insolvency Act have been complied 
with. 
The onus of satisfying the court on these matters rests on the sequestrating 
creditor and there is no onus on the debtor to disprove any element.19 It 
must, however, be noted that in case of compulsory sequestration, the final 
sequestration order must be preceded by a provisional sequestration order 
and that a prima facie case must be established for the provisional order, 
whilst the ordinary onus of proof, that is, on a balance of probability is 
required for the final order.20 
 
2.2  Advantage of creditors: The discretion of the court 
 
In order to be successful with an application for sequestration an applicant must first 
and foremost prove that, apart from compliance with intrinsically procedural 
provisions, the basic requirements as briefly stated above have been met.  
                                                 
14  Ss 3–7 Insolvency Act. 
15  Ss 8–12 Insolvency Act. 
16  S 9(1) Insolvency Act. 
17  S 8 of the Insolvency Act provides for eight acts of insolvency, such as the act quite often relied 
on as provided for in S 8(g), namely where the debtor gives written notice to a creditor that 
he/she is unable to pay any of the debts. See Volkskas Bank ('n Divisie van Absa Bank) v 
Pietersen 1993 1 SA 312 (C) 315–317, regarding the test for insolvency. 
18  S 12(1) Insolvency Act. 
19  Braithwaite v Gilbert 1984 4 SA 717 (W) 718. 
20  Ss 10 and 12 Insolvency Act. 
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Even if a court is satisfied that the aforesaid requirements have been established, it 
is not bound to grant an order for voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration. 
Each case must be decided on its own facts and in each case the court has an 
overriding discretion that must be exercised judicially and upon a consideration of all 
the relevant circumstances.21 It is submitted that each debt situation is unique and 
that the courts should follow a common-sense approach to decide whether 
sequestration will be the best solution to a particular debt situation in a specific 
instance. 
 
The court's discretion usually hinges on the advantage of creditors requirement 
which is common to both procedures although it is generally accepted, due to the 
peculiar wording of Section 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act, that compliance with this 
requirement can more readily be accepted in case of compulsory sequestration than 
in case of voluntary surrender.22 
 
Advantage of creditors thus plays a pivotal role in the exercise of the court's 
discretion. It is often on this basis that a court will decline to grant an order for 
voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration even though all the other 
requirements for the granting of such order may have been satisfied. The advantage 
requirement is more stringent in the case of an application for voluntary surrender 
where the debtor has to prove actual advantage than in the case of compulsory 
sequestration where the advantage requirement has been relaxed and it is merely 
necessary to allege that there is reason to believe that it would be to the advantage 
of his/her creditors if the debtor's estate is sequestrated.23  
 
                                                 
21  Julie Whyte Dresses (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 1970 3 SA 218 (D). 
22  See also Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 44 et seq. With regard to the advantage principle 
in general, see Kunst et al Meskin paras 2.1.4 and 3.2 and Bertelsmann et al Mars paras 3.30 
and 5.35 for comprehensive discussions. Only aspects relevant to this discussion are thus 
discussed here. 
23  S 10(c) Insolvency Act. See also Meskin and Co v Friedman 1948 2 SA 555 (W) 558, in which 
Roper J stated: "The facts put before the court must satisfy it that there is a reasonable prospect 
– not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote – that some pecuniary 
benefit will result to creditors." 
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In determining such advantage, the question is whether a "substantial portion" of the 
creditors,24 determined according to the value of their claims, will derive advantage 
from sequestration.25 In this regard, it is required that sequestration must "yield at the 
least, a not negligible dividend".26 If, after the costs of sequestration have been met, 
there is no payment to creditors, or only a negligible one, there is no such 
advantage.27  
 
However, sequestration is viewed as a drastic measure and courts will therefore also 
consider alternatives to sequestration when considering the advantage principle.28 
Such alternative measures to deal with the debt may include the advantages of 
making use of debt repayment plans that may include an ordinary composition with 
creditors based on agreement, or formal debt relief measures such as administration 
orders in terms of the Magistrates' Courts Act29 or debt rearrangement30 or debt 
restructuring31 as a result of debt review in terms of the NCA. It must be noted that a 
repayment plan of whatever nature will in principle depend on the availability of 
regular income for the debtor in order to make the required payments. Clearly such 
repayment plans may also not be an acceptable option in a particular instance as 
creditors may refuse to grant the debtor a rescheduling of the debt, or statutory 
requirements set for administration orders32 may not be met in that instance. 
 
                                                 
24  Sharrock et al Hockly's Insolvency Law para 3.1.3:"Creditors means all, or at least the general 
body of creditors." 
25  Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 1954 2 SA 109 (N) – hereafter Trust 
Wholesalers; Fesi v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 1 SA 499 (C). 
26  Trust Wholesalers 111. 
27  London Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair 1957 3 SA 591 (D); Ex parte Steenkamp and Related Cases 
1996 3 SA 822 (W). 
28  Gardee v Dhanmanta Holdings 1978 1 SA 1066 (N) 1070: "The notion of advantage to creditors 
is a relative and not an absolute one. Sequestration cannot be said to be to the creditors' 
advantage unless it suits them better than any feasible and reasonably available alternative 
course." 
29  32 of 1944, S 74. Administration orders may not be a viable option in many instances since a 
debtor may only apply if the total amount of the debt is not more than R50 000. It must further be 
noted that S 74R specifically states that an administration order is also no bar to the 
sequestration of the debtor's estate. This is clearly so because the financial situation of the 
debtor may for instance change subsequent to the granting of the administration order. 
30  S 86(7)(b) NCA. 
31  S 86(7)(c) NCA. 
32  Eg that the debt may be in excess of the amount of R50 000 that constitutes the monetary cap 
on applications for administration orders.  
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Although still a rather difficult aspect to deal with in practice, it is submitted that an 
advantage of creditors in the event of voluntary surrender can to some extent be 
determined with more certainty than is the case with compulsory sequestration since 
the court hearing an application for voluntary surrender at least has the advantage of 
a statement of assets and liabilities compiled by or on behalf of the applicant-debtor 
to assist in making provisional calculations.33 
 
It often happens that certain creditors have obtained judgment and even writs of 
execution against some of the assets of the debtor issued in their favour. This 
individual debt collection might then jeopardise the position of other creditors who 
are not yet in the position to enforce their claims against the debtor. In addition, a 
creditor who might be at risk of not obtaining a judgment or writ of attachment 
timeously may revert to compulsory sequestration, since it will prevent the judgment 
creditors who managed to obtain an attachment of certain of the debtor's assets from 
proceeding with the sale in execution which might be to the detriment of creditors not 
yet in possession of a judgment against the debtor. Where the applicant is a 
judgment creditor who has not proceeded to execution in the ordinary course of debt 
enforcement, it is still necessary for him/her to demonstrate a reasonable 
expectation that the anticipated payment to him/her will exceed the likely proceeds of 
such execution.34 In the case in which execution is cheaper and more expeditious 
than sequestration and the applicant is the sole creditor with judgment in his/her 
favour, there will generally be no reason to believe that sequestration will be to the 
advantage of creditors.35 However, in the case in which the applicant has no 
judgment in his/her favour, the particular circumstances may be indicative that the 
machinery of the Insolvency Act will be quicker and more effective than following the 
route of issuing summons and moving for judgment and execution.36 Consequently, 
a creditor will sometimes indicate in an application for compulsory sequestration that 
it would be to the advantage of the creditors as a group if a sequestration order is 
granted, since it will effect a fair distribution of the proceeds of the available assets 
                                                 
33  Some divisions of the High Court use practice guidelines in this regard; see eg para F4.2 of the 
Gauteng High Court Practice Directives Manual. 
34  Gardee case 1069–1070; Mamacos v Davids 1976 1 SA 19 (C). 
35  Gardee case; ABSA Bank Ltd v De Klerk and Related Cases 1999 4 SA 835 (E) 839; Maxwell v 
Holderness [2009] JOL 23740 (KZP). 
36  Followed in the Maxwell case paras 9–11. 
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amongst the creditors. In many instances, it is alleged in the founding affidavit that it 
will be to the advantage of creditors if the estate vests in the trustee after 
sequestration, since the debtor will then be prevented from further disposing of 
his/her property and the trustee will also be able to reclaim certain estate property 
disposed of by the debtor prior to sequestration.37 These last-mentioned reasons 
advanced to indicate an advantage of creditors are also indicative that there usually 
is an inherent urgency in compulsory sequestration applications.38  
 
In both instances, that is, voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration, 
creditors who are not in favour of sequestration of the estate of the debtor may also 
intervene in the matter and oppose the application. Such interventions will usually be 
based on the notion that sequestration of the debtor's estate is not the best option in 
the circumstances and will thus according to the opposing party or parties not be to 
the advantage of the creditors as a group. Clearly, strong resistance against an 
application for sequestration by creditors on the basis that it is not to their advantage 
should also direct the court in exercising its discretion to grant or to deny the relief 
applied for. However, the court is not bound thereby, but it is generally accepted that 
each creditor must know what is in his/her own commercial interests.39 
 
As indicated above, a provisional sequestration order must first be considered before 
the court will decide on making it a final sequestration order in case of compulsory 
sequestration.40 The court holds a discretion in this regard and in De Waard v 
Andrew and Thienhaus Ltd41 the court's discretion was expressed as follows: "[T]he 
Court has a large discretion in regard to making the rule absolute: and in exercising 
that discretion the condition of a man's assets and his general financial position will 
be important elements to be considered." 
 
                                                 
37  BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Furstenburg 1966 1 SA 717 (O) 720; Walker v Walker [1998] 2 All 
SA 382 (W) 387; Dunlop Tyres (Pty) v Brewitt 1999 2 SA 580 (W) 583; Lynn and Main Inc v 
Naidoo 2006 1 SA 59 (N) 68–69; Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v Hawker Air 
Services (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v Hawker Aviation 
Partnership 2006 4 SA 292 (SCA) 306. 
38  See in general Stride v Castelein 2000 3 SA 662 (W) and Van Heerden and Boraine 2001 Obiter 
440–462. 
39  Kunst et al Meskin para 2.1.5. 
40  Kunst et al Meskin para 2.1.13. 
41  1907 TS 727 733. 
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Finally, as far as the discretion of the court is concerned, it must also be noted that a 
court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its processes. Thus, even 
where all the requirements for granting a sequestration order are met, the court may 
refuse the order if it amounts to abuse in one way or another.42 
 
3  Ex parte Ford re voluntary surrender and the NCA 
 
3.1  Case discussion 
 
In Ex parte Ford,43 three applications for voluntary surrender served before the 
unopposed motion court. It appeared that a major portion of each applicant's 
liabilities consisted of credit agreement debt to which the NCA applied.44 The court 
found this debt to be strikingly disproportionate in relation to the relatively modest 
income of each of the applicants.45 In each of the applications, it was averred that 
the applicants had "become insolvent by misfortune and due to circumstances 
beyond their control, without fraud or dishonesty on their part".46 The court 
consequently indicated that grounds for cogent suspicion of at least some degree of 
reckless credit extension presented themselves strongly on the disclosed facts in 
each of the applications.47 It indicated that one of the objects of the NCA is to 
discourage reckless credit and it referred to the provisions dealing with same.48 The 
court then referred to its powers in terms of Section 85 of the NCA, which provides 
that, in any court proceeding in which a credit agreement is being considered, if it is 
alleged that a consumer is over-indebted, the court may refer it to a debt counsellor 
for debt review and a recommendation to court, or alternatively, the court itself may 
                                                 
42  See Kunst et al Meskin para 2.1.5 and cases referred to. 
43  2009 3 SA 376 (WCC); also reported in [2009] JOL 23412 (WCC). Although this case has 
already been discussed within a somewhat different context in Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 
PELJ, that discussion is still relied on and relevant for the purposes of this publication, since it 
attempts to address and to contrast the impact of NCA on both types of sequestration, ie 
voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration in view of more recent case law. 
44  Ex parte Ford para 2. 
45  Ex parte Ford para 3. 
46  Ex parte Ford. 
47  Ex parte Ford. The allegation of absence of fraud by the consumers caused the court to assume 
that in applying for the credit which became the unaffordable burden that drove the applicants to 
seek the surrender of their estates, the credit grantors involved were fully informed of the 
apparent limits of the applicants' inability to service the debt or could easily have ascertained the 
position had they made reasonable enquiries before granting the loans or credit facilities in 
question. 
48  Ex parte Ford paras 4–7. 
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declare the consumer over-indebted and make an order contemplated in Section 87 
to relieve the consumer's over-indebtedness.49 It pointed out that an evaluation by a 
debt counsellor may lead to one or more of the consumer's credit agreements being 
declared reckless credit, resulting in the setting aside of the agreements or the 
suspension of the force and effect thereof.50  
 
In view of the aforementioned, the court deemed it fit to call upon counsel for the 
applicants to present argument as to why the over-indebtedness of the applicants 
should not more appropriately be addressed by using the mechanisms of the NCA 
"instead of the blunter instrument afforded in terms of the voluntary surrender 
remedy under the Insolvency Act".51 
 
The court indicated that, in its opinion, Section 85 is cast in very wide terms as is 
evidenced by the words "in any court proceedings".52 Thus, the limitation of Section 
85 to "proceedings in which a credit agreement is being considered" does not imply 
that the proceedings in question are restricted only to those in which the 
enforcement of a credit agreement is in issue.53 It is therefore clear that a court may 
also apply Section 85 of the NCA during a court procedure as with an application for 
voluntary surrender. The section clearly grants a court additional discretionary power 
in this context with the view of assisting an over-indebted consumer with debt relief 
measures provided for by the NCA. 
 
                                                 
49  S 85(a) and (b) NCA. See further S 87, which allows the court to declare a credit agreement 
reckless and/or re-arrange the consumer's credit agreement obligations. 
50  Ex parte Ford para 9.  
51  Ex parte Ford para 10. 
52  Ex parte Ford para 12. See also para 11 in which counsel for the applicant pointed out that the 
legislature had been pertinently cognisant of the Insolvency Act when it enacted the NCA as is 
apparent from the amendment of S 84 of the Insolvency Act by Schedule 2 of the NCA. Counsel 
stressed this connection that the legislature had not seen fit to make any changes to the 
provisions of the Insolvency Act concerning voluntary surrender. He submitted that S 85 of the 
NCA was in any event not applicable in proceedings for voluntary surrender under the Insolvency 
Act, relying mainly on the argument that there were no credit agreements before the court in the 
current matter. In this regard, he thus argued that S 85 only applies to instances in which the 
consumer resists a credit grantor's claim for performance in terms of a credit agreement on 
grounds of over-indebtedness. The court, however, did not agree with these arguments.  
53  Ex parte Ford. 
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Furthermore, the court pointed out that in terms of the Insolvency Act, "a court has to 
be fully informed of the applicant's proprietary situation54 and that an applicant for 
voluntary surrender must also satisfy the court that the surrender of his estate will be 
to the advantage of creditors".55 It remarked that these considerations, in a matter 
like any of the three applications before the court where over-indebtedness is almost 
exclusively related to debt arising from credit agreements, require the court to take 
the existence and effect of those agreements into account.56 It held that the word 
"consider" referred to in Section 85 has a broad connotation: in context, it denotes 
that the court proceedings contemplated by the provision must be proceedings in 
which a credit agreement is taken into account as relevant matter.57 
 
The court remarked that the fact that the NCA leaves the provisions of the 
Insolvency Act regarding voluntary surrender generally unaffected, acknowledges 
that insolvency can arise in a great variety of circumstances, many of them quite 
unrelated to over-indebtedness arising from credit agreements as defined in the 
NCA.58 Therefore, it was of the opinion that insolvents whose misfortune arises out 
of credit agreement transactions would be well advised for the reasons indicated 
hereinafter to take into account the policy and objects of the NCA and also the 
special remedies provided by it before opting to apply for the surrender of their 
estates under the Insolvency Act rather than availing themselves of the provisions 
under the NCA.59 
 
Furthermore, the court pointed out that in all three applications the applicants filed 
supplementary affidavits in which they confirmed having been made aware of the 
court's desire to hear argument on the application of Section 85 of the NCA in the 
context of the apparent character of their over-indebtedness.60 Each of them testified 
                                                 
54  Ex parte Ford para 13, with reference to Bertelsmann et al Mars para 3.15. 
55  Ex parte Ford. 
56  Ex parte Ford. 
57  Ex parte Ford. 
58  Ex parte Ford para 14. 
59  Ex parte Ford. 
60  Ex parte Ford para 15. 
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that they had indeed considered debt counselling but set out in detail how financially 
impracticable an arrangement of debt repayment would be.61 
 
However, the court was dissatisfied, as there was no indication based on the 
evidence in any of the three applications that consideration was given in the context 
of debt counselling to anything beyond an administered debt collection.62 In 
particular, there was no indication that the debt counsellors engaged by the 
applicants gave any consideration to obtaining declarations of reckless credit.63 
 
Despite advocating its powers in terms of Section 85, the court still held that, in view 
of the applicants' resistance to assistance in terms of Section 85 of the NCA, it was 
not going to refer their credit agreements for investigation and report by a debt 
counsellor64 and declared that it was nevertheless open to the applicants to take the 
necessary steps in this regard on their own initiative. 
 
In addition, the court indicated that it was not prepared to exercise its discretion in 
favour of granting the applications for voluntary surrender owing to the applicants' 
failure to properly explain why their credit agreement debt was not amenable to 
administration under the NCA to their own benefit, as well as to that of their credit-
granting creditors who acted responsibly – and not recklessly – in extending credit.65 
 
The court considered it as its duty, in the exercise of its discretion in cases such as 
the present, to have proper regard to giving due effect to the public policy reflected in 
the NCA, which gives preference to rights of responsible credit grantors over 
reckless credit grantors and supports full satisfaction, as far as possible, by 
consumers of all financial obligations.66 
 
                                                 
61  Ex parte Ford. In this regard, the applicants each set out in tabulated form that the application of 
their disposable income over the next seven years to service their current debt would still leave 
them heavily indebted at the end of the period. It is not clear why the court did not find this 
information helpful. 
62  Ex parte Ford para 16. 
63  Ex parte Ford. 
64  Ex parte Ford para 17. 
65  Ex parte Ford. 
66  Ex parte Ford para 20. 
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In closing, the court indicated that the argument that in essence it is for the 
applicants to choose the form of relief that suits their convenience by mechanically 
and superficially satisfying the relevant statutory requirements under the Insolvency 
Act is a misdirected approach, especially where the granting of a selected remedy is 
discretionary,67 and emphasised that the primary object of voluntary surrenders is 
not the relief of harassed debtors.68 The court indicated that there is moreover a 
consonance between the objects of the relevant provisions of the NCA and the 
Insolvency Act, that is, "not to deprive creditors of their claims but merely to regulate 
the manner and extent of their payment".69 However, on the incomplete facts 
disclosed in the current applications, the court held that it was left with the 
impression that the machinery of the NCA is the more appropriate mechanism to be 
used and consequently refused the applications.70  
 
In sum, in exercising its discretion against the applicants, the court relied heavily on 
notions that the credit granted to the applicants may have amounted to reckless 
credit; the information on their debt review efforts it deemed insufficient to explain 
why the applicants had not availed themselves adequately of the remedies provided 
for by the NCA; and that the monetary advantage demonstrated in the applications 
was marginal.71  
 
3.2 Some observations with regard to reckless credit 
 
The judge clearly wanted the applicants in this instance to gain a proper 
determination on whether their credit agreements amounted to reckless credit, since 
the court had a suspicion that this was not done.72 Although this discussion is not 
intended to deal extensively with reckless credit and its consequences for an over-
indebted debtor as such,73 it must be mentioned that from a debt relief point of view 
                                                 
67  Ex parte Ford para 19, with reference to Ex parte Hayes 1970 4 SA (NC) 96C. 
68  Ex parte Ford para 21, with reference to Ex parte Pillay; Mayet v Pillay 1955 2 SA 309 (N) 311E. 
69  Ex parte Ford, with reference to Nel v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building 1996 1 SA 131 
(SCA) 138E. 
70  Ex parte Ford paras 21–22.  
71  Ex parte Ford para 18. 
72  S 83(1) of the NCA also grants a court in any court proceedings in which a credit agreement is 
considered the power to declare any credit agreement to be reckless as determined in terms of 
Part D of the NCA. The Ford judgment did not consider this possibility in particular. 
73  See further Vessio 2009 TSAR 272; Stoop 2009 SA Merc LJ 365; Scholtz et al Guide para 11.4. 
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the question could be raised as to the effectiveness of the reckless credit remedies 
in this regard, since this was not indicated by the court.74  
 
In brief, the NCA provides for three specifically defined types of reckless credit 
agreements – prescribing the remedy in each instance. The first and second types of 
reckless credit in terms of Sections 80(1)(a) and 80(1)(b)(i) render a credit 
agreement a reckless credit agreement if the credit provider failed to conduct an 
assessment as required by Section 81(2), or when the credit agreement was made, 
or at the time when the amount approved in terms of the agreement is increased, the 
credit provider (despite) having conducted an assessment as required by Section 
81(2), entered into a credit agreement with the consumer, despite the fact that the 
preponderance of information available to the credit provider indicated that the 
consumer did not generally understand or appreciate his/her risks, costs or 
obligations under the proposed credit agreement. The third type of reckless credit in 
terms of Section 80(1)(b)(ii) deals with those instances in which the preponderance 
of information available to the credit provider indicated that entering into that credit 
agreement would make the consumer over-indebted and despite this, the credit 
provider entered into the specific credit agreement with the consumer.  
 
The statutory powers of the court in respect of the first two types of reckless credit 
referred to are that it may make an order setting aside all or part of the consumer's 
rights and obligations under that agreement, as it deems just and reasonable in the 
circumstances.75 Alternatively, it may suspend the force and effect of that specific 
credit agreement in which instance the provisions of Section 83(3(b)(i) will apply.76 
Regarding the third type of reckless credit that caused the over-indebtedness of the 
consumer, the court may suspend the force and effect of such an agreement for a 
                                                 
74  Some commentators believe that South African law needs a complete overhaul of its debt relief 
measures since current procedures such as administration orders in terms of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act and the requirements for voluntary surrender are not in line with modern international 
developments. Criticism against the measures such as debt restructuring introduced in the NCA 
also exists, since they do not cover all instances and the current procedure is fraught with 
practical difficulties. The legislature also did not consider their effect on existing procedures. See 
Boraine 2003 De Jure 217; Roestoff "'n Kritiese evaluasie van skuldverligtingsmaatreëls"; 
Roestoff and Jacobs 1997 De Jure 189 and Roestoff et al 2009 PELJ 247 regarding technical 
difficulties regarding debt review in terms of the NCA. 
75  S 83(2)(a) NCA. 
76  S 83(2)(b) NCA. 
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determined period.77 Without elaborating on this aspect, it is submitted that from a 
debt relief point of view, a declaration of reckless credit will not necessarily offer a 
lasting solution to a debtor's over-indebtedness or insolvency. The reasons for this 
are that even where a court sets all or some of the debtor's rights and obligations 
under an agreement aside, the credit provider should still in principle be able to claim 
restoration – the extent of which will depend on the basis of the claim – since the 
NCA does not state that a reckless credit agreement is illegal and therefore null and 
void, and restoration is also not prohibited. Where a credit agreement is suspended, 
it may bring some relief regarding the repayment of finance charges as provided for 
in Section 84 but once the suspended period has elapsed the consumer will once 
again become liable to repay at least the capital amount credit.  
 
4 Compulsory sequestration and the NCA following Investec Bank Limited 
v Mutemeri 
 
4.1 Background 
 
In this case, the applicants applied for the compulsory sequestration of the common 
estate of the respondents who were deemed to be married in community of property 
to each other. It appears that the debts relied on by the applicants were all credit 
agreements in terms of the NCA. It is not clear from the reported facts whether the 
respondents also had other types of debts that did not qualify as credit agreements. 
The judgment is based on the initial application for a provisional sequestration order. 
In essence, the line of defence followed by the respondents was that since the debts 
amounted to credit agreements in terms of the NCA and as they had already applied 
for debt review in terms of the NCA by the time that the sequestration application 
was brought, the sequestration application against them was barred because it 
amounted to debt enforcement in terms of the NCA.78 
 
Before discussing the opposition against the application based on provisions of the 
NCA, it will suffice for the purposes of this discussion to state that the court accepted 
that the basic requirements for such an application had been met. From the 
                                                 
77  Ss 83(3)–(4) and 84 NCA. 
78  Mutemeri para 1. 
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judgment, it appears that the respondents did not take real issue with any of the 
details of the applicants' claims except to deny that the third claim was one for 
R500 000.79 The court also accepted as common cause that the applicants had 
substantial liquidated claims against the respondents.80 
 
The application was based on alleged acts of insolvency in terms of Section 8(g) of 
the Insolvency Act, and the court apparently accepted, by inference, that their 
liabilities exceeded their assets.81 Although the respondents challenged the 
advantage of creditors requirement, the court found sufficient evidence that there 
was prima facie reason to believe that the granting of the order would be to the 
advantage of the creditors. 82  
 
However, this case did not really turn on these basic requirements for compulsory 
sequestration but rather on the defences argued by the respondents relating to the 
NCA and its impact on sequestration applications. 
 
4.2 Defences against the application for sequestration based on the NCA 
 
It was common cause that the applicants' claims against the respondents amounted 
to "credit agreements", that the applicants were the "credit providers" and that the 
respondents were the "consumers" in terms of the NCA.83 The respondents thus 
raised a number of defences based on the NCA and contended that the applicants 
were precluded by the NCA from seeking their sequestration in this application.84  
 
The respondents firstly argued that they had applied for debt review in terms of 
Section 86, on which application a debt counsellor accepted that they were over-
indebted and gave notice to the creditors of this state of affairs and subsequently 
applied to the Magistrate's Court for the respondents' debts to be restructured in 
                                                 
79  Mutemeri para 10. 
80  Mutemeri para 8. 
81  Mutemeri paras 11 and 12. 
82  Mutemeri paras 13–17. 
83  Mutemeri para 18. 
84  Mutemeri para 19. 
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terms of Sections 86 and 87 of the NCA.85 Based on this fact, the argument for the 
respondents was that until the hearing of their debt-restructuring application (which 
was enrolled for a date nearly a year after the date of the sequestration 
proceedings), no legal proceedings could be instituted against them for enforcement 
of the applicants' claims under the credit agreements and, more importantly for this 
discussion, that the application for sequestration constituted such debt enforcement 
proceedings.86 
 
In their argument, the respondents relied in the first place on Sections 129(1)(b) and 
130(1)(b) of the NCA. The relevant parts of these provisions read as follows: 
 
129. Required procedures before debt enforcement. 
(1) If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit 
provider— 
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing 
and propose that the consumer refer the credit agreement to 
a debt counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, 
consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent 
that the parties resolve any dispute under the agreement or 
develop and agree on a plan to bring the payments under 
the agreement up to date; and 
(b) subject to section 130(2), may not commence any legal 
proceedings to enforce the agreement before— 
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as contemplated 
in paragraph (a), or in section 86(10), as the case may 
be, and 
(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in section 
130. 
 
130. Debt procedures in a Court. 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) a credit provider may approach the court 
for an order to enforce a credit agreement only if, at that time, the 
consumer is in default and has been in default under that credit 
agreement for at least 20 business days and— 
(a) ... 
(b) in the case of a notice contemplated in section 129 (1), the 
consumer has— 
(i) not responded to that notice; or 
(ii) responded to the notice by rejecting the credit 
provider's proposals. 
 
                                                 
85  Mutemeri para 2. This application to the Magistrate's Court was launched on 15 May 2009 but 
was only due to be heard on 11 August 2010. 
86  Mutemeri para 2. 
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The respondents were in default by 7 August 2008, on which date the applicants did 
in fact provide the respondents with the prescribed Section 129(1)(a) notices – 
apparently with the view of initiating ordinary debt enforcement procedures.87 Initially, 
the respondents did not make use of any of the debt relief options provided for by the 
NCA but promised instead to pay their outstanding arrears under the credit 
agreements over time and posed a settlement in a letter to the applicants on 22 
August 2008.88 They also indicated that they would seek the assistance of a debt 
counsellor.89 
 
Since this counter-proposal was not acceptable to the applicants, they attempted to 
enforce the credit agreements by way of an application for payment of their claims 
on 16 October 2008.90 Motlaung AJ dismissed this application on 13 February 2009 
by holding that the applicants were precluded by Section 130(1) of the NCA from 
enforcing their claims without first considering and either accepting or rejecting the 
respondents' counter-proposal. 
 
Suffice to say for the purposes of this discussion that the applicants argued that 
Motlaung AJ erred in this conclusion and they intended to appeal that judgment. The 
applicants submitted that they had complied with Section 130(1)(b) because the 
respondents' failure to adopt and implement the applicants' proposals and their 
counter-proposal amounted to a failure to respond to, or a rejection of, the 
applicants' proposals within the meaning of Section 130(1)(b) as quoted above. 
 
Although the respondents had not adopted or implemented any of the applicants' 
proposals before the above-mentioned application of 16 October 2008 to enforce the 
credit agreements was launched, they did so while the judgment in that application 
was pending by applying for debt review to a debt counsellor on 13 January 2009.91 
It is important to note that at the time of the application before Motlaung AJ on 16 
                                                 
87  Mutemeri para 20. 
88  Mutemeri para 21. 
89  Mutemeri para 21. 
90  Mutemeri para 22. It is to be noted that the application procedure is to be used with caution when 
enforcing a debt, since in general serious factual disputes may be readily entertained in such 
instances, but in this case it is assumed that the applicants' credit provider did not really 
anticipate a dispute as to the existence and the amount of the debt.  
91  Mutemeri para 24. 
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October 2008 the applicants had not yet applied for debt review. Thus, the effect of a 
pending debt review on individual enforcement proceedings was not an issue in that 
matter. 
 
The applicants thereafter decided to apply for the compulsory sequestration of the 
respondents whose debt counsellor had on 15 May 2009 launched an application for 
debt restructuring to court on 15 May 2009 but which restructuring, notably, was 
enrolled for hearing on 11 August 2010 only, which was approximately a year from 
the date of the sequestration application. 
 
In the subsequent sequestration application, the applicants argued that their default 
notices in terms of Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA were "steps taken to enforce the 
credit agreement" as contemplated in Section 129 and that the respondents were 
therefore precluded by Section 86(2) of the NCA from applying for review of their 
credit agreements. Without resolving this issue, the court merely observed by way of 
an obiter dictum that the argument exposed an anomaly in the applicants' case and 
in the NCA itself, in that if a default notice in terms of Section 129(1) were to be 
regarded as a "step contemplated in s 129" to enforce a credit agreement, the very 
step to inform the consumer-debtor about his/her rights to – amongst other things – 
seek assistance from a debt counsellor, would have prevented him/her from doing 
so.92 In other words, on this interpretation, the court reasoned that a default notice 
would propose to the consumer that he/she make application to a debt counsellor 
but at the same time trigger the bar in terms of Section 86(2) that precludes the 
consumer from doing so. Since it was not necessary to rule on this issue for the 
purposes of this judgment, the court merely accepted in favour of the respondents, 
as Motlaung AJ had found in the application of 16 October 2008 that the applicants 
did not meet the requirements of the said Section 130(1) and were accordingly 
precluded from approaching the court "for an order to enforce a credit agreement" by 
way of a debt enforcement procedure.93  
 
The court stated, however, that the real legal issue that had to be answered in the 
present sequestration application, was whether an application for compulsory 
                                                 
92  Mutemeri paras 25 and 26. 
93  Mutemeri para 26. 
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sequestration of the estate of a consumer-debtor amounted to "an order to enforce a 
credit agreement" within the meaning of Section 130(1) of the NCA.94 In identifying 
this question, the court, relying on Estate Logie v Priest,95 mentioned that there is 
little doubt that a sequestrating creditor's motive in applying for the sequestration of 
its debtor may be and often is to obtain payment of its debt. However, the court 
pointed out that the question whether an application for sequestration constitutes an 
application "for an order to enforce a credit agreement" within the meaning of 
Section 130(1) of the NCA, depends on the nature of the relief sought by the creditor 
and not on the sequestrating creditor's underlying motive in bringing the 
application.96 Consequently, whatever the underlying motive, an application for 
compulsory sequestration is not barred by Section 130(1) of the NCA unless it is in 
fact (regarded as) an application for an order "to enforce a credit agreement".97 
 
The court proceeded to consider case law that dealt with the very nature of a 
sequestration order, or it is submitted, rather an application for compulsory 
sequestration.98 In Collett v Priest99 the Appellate Division held that a "civil suit" for 
the purposes of a statutory provision that dealt with appeals was a "legal proceeding 
in which one party sues for or claims something from another" and that "civil suit" did 
not include an application for sequestration. 
 
It is to be noted that the court in Collett v Priest100 made the following very significant 
statement on the nature of sequestration proceedings: 
The order placing a person's estate under sequestration cannot fittingly be 
described as an order for a debt due by the debtor to the creditor. 
Sequestration proceedings are instituted by a creditor against a debtor not 
for the purpose of claiming something from the latter, but for the purpose of 
setting the machinery of the law in motion to have the debtor declared 
insolvent. No order in the nature of a declaration of rights or of giving or 
doing something is given against the debtor. The order sequestrating his 
estate affects the civil status of the debtor and results in vesting his estate in 
the Master. No doubt before an order so serious in its consequences to the 
                                                 
94  Mutemeri para 26. 
95  1926 AD 312 319. 
96  Mutemeri para 28. 
97  Mutemeri para 28. 
98  Mutemeri paras 29–31. 
99  1931 AD 290. 
100  At 299. 
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debtor is given the court satisfies itself as to the correctness of the 
allegations in the petition. It may for example have to determine whether the 
debtor owes the money as alleged in the petition. But while the court has to 
determine whether the allegations are correct, there is no claim by the 
creditor against the debtor to pay him what is due nor is the court asked to 
give any judgment, decree or order against the debtor upon any such claim. 
 
In Prudential Shippers SA Ltd v Tempest Clothing Co (Pty) Ltd,101 the applicant 
applied for the winding-up of the respondent-company's estate. The respondent 
alleged that the debt, upon which the applicant relied, had arisen from a money-
lending transaction subject to the Limitation and Disclosure of Finance Charges 
Act.102 It asked that the applicant's officers be examined under Section 11 of that Act. 
The section provided for such an examination in any proceedings "for the recovery of 
a debt" in pursuance of a money-lending transaction. McEwan J103 held that an 
application for the winding-up of a debtor's estate did not constitute proceedings "for 
the recovery of a debt". It is submitted that although this was not a sequestration 
application, the same considerations relating to a winding-up would by analogy apply 
to sequestration applications in this regard. 
 
In the Mutemeri case having referred to the aforementioned cases, the court stated 
that it appeared that the rationale of these judgments was equally applicable to the 
proper interpretation of Section 130(1) of the NCA, which applies only to an 
application to court "for an order to enforce a credit agreement".104 Trengove AJ 
significantly declared that Section 130(1) of the NCA therefore does not apply to a 
compulsory sequestration application of a consumer's estate by a credit provider 
based on a claim in terms of a credit agreement between them, as such application 
is "not one for an order enforcing the credit provider's claim against the consumer". 
In further support of its contention, the court referred to Section 9(2) of the 
Insolvency Act that indeed makes it clear that the sequestrating creditor's claim need 
not even be due, that is, need not yet be enforceable. It indicated that an application 
for sequestration may be made on the strength of a claim that is not yet enforceable 
                                                 
101  1976 2 SA 856(W) – hereafter Prudential Shippers. 
102  73 of 1968. 
103  See further Prudential Shippers 863D–865A. 
104  Mutemeri para 31. 
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because a sequestration order is not an order for enforcement of a claim.105 The 
purpose or effect of the sequestration is thus merely to bring about a convergence of 
claims against an insolvent estate to ensure that it is properly wound up in an orderly 
fashion and that the creditors are treated equally. 
 
The court pointed out that the reason that the applicant must have a liquidated claim 
against the debtor is not because the application is to enforce the debt but to show 
that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the application.106 
 
The respondents, however, submitted that even if the sequestration application did 
not amount to an enforcement procedure envisaged in Section 130(1) of the NCA, 
such application is in any event subject to Section 130(3) which is not limited to 
applications for the enforcement of credit agreements but extends to "any 
proceeding commenced in a court in respect of a credit agreement".107 Section 
130(3) reads as follows: 
 
Despite any provision of law or contract to the contrary, in any proceedings 
commenced in a court in respect of a credit agreement to which this Act 
applies, the court may determine the matter only if the court is satisfied that 
(a) in the case of proceedings to which sections 127, 129 or 131 
apply, the procedures required by those sections have been 
complied with. 
 
An alternative submission by the respondents was thus that an application for 
sequestration, although not a procedure for debt enforcement, at least was a 
proceeding "in respect of a credit agreement" within the meaning of Section 130(3) 
and that it thus rendered such an application subject to the requirements of Section 
129 of the NCA.108 
 
On this point, the court ruled that Section 130(3) did not extend the scope of Section 
129 and that it merely provides that in proceedings (already) subject to the 
requirements of Section 129 the court must be satisfied that there has been 
                                                 
105  Mutemeri para 31. 
106  Mutemeri para 31. 
107  Mutemeri para 32. 
108  Mutemeri para 33. 
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compliance with those requirements.109 The court indicated that one accordingly has 
to turn to Section 129 to determine whether its requirements apply to applications for 
sequestration.110 However, it pointed out that the only relevant requirements are 
those laid down by Section 129(1)(b) but that they only apply to "legal proceedings to 
enforce" credit agreements and that it had already concluded that applications for 
(compulsory) sequestration are not debt enforcement proceedings.111 Sequestration 
applications are accordingly not subject to the requirements of Section 129(1)(b) and 
thus do not require the credit provider to first send the consumer a Section 129(1)(a) 
notice as envisaged by Section 130(3) before the credit provider can commence with 
sequestration proceedings.  
 
Lastly, the respondents relied on Section 88(3) of the NCA.112 It provides, inter alia, 
that a credit provider who receives notice of a consumer's application for debt review 
in terms of Section 86(4)(b)(i) "may not exercise or enforce by litigation or other 
judicial process any right or security" under a credit agreement between the credit 
provider and the consumer, until certain conditions have been met. The court also 
rejected this argument as it held, on the basis of the reasons already mentioned 
above, that an application by a credit provider for the sequestration of a consumer 
does not constitute litigation or other judicial process by which the credit provider 
exercises or enforces any right under the credit agreement between itself and the 
consumer.113 The court reiterated that the credit provider may rely on its claim in 
terms of a credit agreement to qualify as a creditor with standing to bring the 
application for the sequestration of the consumer – but it does not exercise or 
enforce its rights in doing so.114  
                                                 
109  Mutemeri para 33. 
110  Mutemeri para 33. 
111  Mutemeri para 33. 
112  Mutemeri para 34. 
113  Mutemeri para 34. 
114  Mutemeri para 34. 
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4.3  Intervention by a debt counsellor in sequestration applications 
 
It is also noteworthy that the respondents' debt counsellor contended that he had a 
direct and substantial interest in the application for the respondents' sequestration by 
virtue of his functions as their debt counsellor in terms of Section 86 of the NCA.115 
 
In rejecting this argument, the court held that the role of the debt counsellors under 
the NCA is confined to the functions they perform in terms of Sections 71 and 86 of 
the NCA. They are facilitators and mediators between consumers who have become 
over-indebted on the one hand, and their credit providers on the other.116 The debt 
counsellor therefore does not have a direct and substantial interest in the application 
for the sequestration of the respondents' estate merely because he is acting as their 
debt counsellor in terms of Section 86 of the NCA.117 
 
5 The meaning of debt enforcement in the NCA 
 
As Trengove AJ stated in the Mutemeri case, the crucial question is whether an 
application for (compulsory) sequestration constitutes "debt enforcement" as meant 
by the NCA.118 The answer to this question is of extreme significance, as it can have 
severe implications for a credit provider. If the answer is affirmative it, inter alia, 
would have the effect that: 
 
(a) where debt enforcement by compulsory sequestration is sought by a credit 
provider, such credit provider will have to comply with the requirements of 
Section 129(1)(a) as a mandatory step prior to debt enforcement119 as well as 
any other provisions of the NCA relating to debt enforcement; or 
                                                 
115  Mutemeri para 36. 
116  See also The National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 295 (GNP). 
117  Mutemeri paras 37–40. 
118  It is submitted that voluntary surrender is a debtor-induced procedure and thus does not give rise 
to the question of whether it amounts to debt enforcement. Also see 6.2. 
119  In fact, all the provisions of the NCA relating to debt enforcement would thus apply. 
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(b) where debt enforcement by compulsory sequestration is sought against a 
consumer who (as with the Mutemeris) is under debt review120 by the time that 
the application for compulsory sequestration is brought, such pending debt 
review will as a result of the provisions of Section 88(3) of the NCA constitute a 
bar against compulsory sequestration.121 
 
On such a construction, with respect to a natural person consumer, a credit provider 
who wishes to apply for compulsory sequestration would first be obliged to deliver122 
to the consumer a Section 129(1)(a) notice drawing the consumer's attention to 
his/her default and requiring him/her to, inter alia, consult with a debt counsellor for 
purposes of resolving a dispute or agreeing on a debt repayment plan. Of course, 
the sending of a section letter under Section 129(1)(a) in such an instance triggers 
the yet unresolved debate on whether such natural person-consumer can then apply 
for debt review123 – which, if the consumer is competent to apply for it, will trigger the 
Section 88(3) bar referred to in (b) if the consumer is subject to a pending debt 
review by the time the credit provider applies for compulsory sequestration. 
 
If the question as to whether compulsory sequestration constitutes "debt 
enforcement" for purposes of the NCA is answered in the negative, it has the effect 
that a credit provider can apply to have a consumer sequestrated without having to 
comply with Section 129(1)(a) as a prior step or without having the worry that a 
pending debt review might trigger the bar contained in Section 88(3) of the NCA, as 
such bar is only operative in respect of debt enforcement by litigation. 
 
                                                 
120  Whether the Mutemeris could have gone for debt review is debatable but need not be resolved 
for purposes of this discussion. 
121  In so far as the second scenario is concerned, namely the bar created by a pending debt review, 
it should be noted that juristic person consumers to whom the NCA applies are not entitled to 
apply for debt review. Thus, if compulsory sequestration proceedings are regarded as "debt 
enforcement", it is only in those instances in which the consumer is a natural person that a 
pending debt review can constitute a bar against compulsory sequestration. It would thus appear 
that the compulsory liquidation of a juristic person such as a company by a credit provider, if 
such compulsory liquidated should by analogy be regarded as debt enforcement, would not be 
hit by the S 88(3) bar. 
122  See Van Heerden and Coetzee 2009 PELJ for a discussion of Munien v BMW Financial Services 
(SA) (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 SA 549 (KZD). 
123  See Scholtz et al Guide para 11.3.3.2(D). 
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It is submitted that in the event of compulsory sequestration not being debt 
enforcement for purposes of the NCA, the possible effect of a pending debt review 
on compulsory sequestration proceedings could be that it may impact on the 
advantage of creditors requirement, which we attempt to address later in this 
discussion.  
 
From the Mutemeri decision, it is clear that although the parties identified the crucial 
question correctly, they became sidetracked with the issues with the result that the 
structure of their argument was wrong. What the parties should have done – given 
the fact that they were apparently under debt review – was to first, on the basis that 
they contended that compulsory sequestration equates to debt review, have raised 
their final argument, namely that Section 88(3) barred sequestration. If the court 
agreed with their contention regarding the nature of compulsory sequestration being 
a debt enforcement procedure, this would have disposed of the matter entirely and 
the debt enforcement provisions in Sections 129 and 130 of the NCA would be 
irrelevant. However, the parties chose to first deal with compliance with the 
requirements of Section 129(1)(a), which it is submitted, should only have been an 
issue in this matter if they raised it as an alternative defence on the basis that the 
court might have found that they were not duly under debt review. 
 
It is, however, submitted that the answer to the question whether sequestration 
constitutes debt enforcement as referred to by the NCA should be in the negative. To 
adopt the view that compulsory sequestration amounts to debt enforcement would 
be too simplistic. In the first instance, in addition to all the reasons the court in 
Mutemeri advanced for compulsory sequestration not being debt enforcement, it 
should be noted that an application for compulsory sequestration does not result in a 
civil judgment and does not convert the credit provider into a judgment creditor.  
 
Other arguments that may be raised as to the nature and purpose of sequestration 
as compared to ordinary debt enforcement is that the insolvent estate vests in the 
trustee, thereby preventing the debtor from further disposing of estate property, the 
trustee may hold insolvency enquiries to search for property disposed of by the 
debtor for instance, the Insolvency Act clothes the trustee with extensive powers to 
trace estate property that could be utilised to pay creditors by holding interrogations 
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and reclaiming property by way of special insolvency devices such as voidable 
disposition remedies.124 There is also some explanation of the essence of insolvency 
law to be found in the well-known and often-cited dicta in Walker v Syfret125 in which 
the court explained the key concept of concursus creditorum following a 
sequestration order as follows:  
 
The sequestration order crystallises the insolvent's position; the hand of the 
law is laid upon the estate, and at once the rights of the general body of 
creditors have to be taken into consideration. No transaction can thereafter 
be entered into with regard to estate matters by a single creditor to the 
prejudice of the general body. The claim of each creditor must be dealt with 
as it existed at the issue of the order. 
 
It must be mentioned that some insolvency law commentators refer to insolvency as 
a collective debt-collecting device as opposed to the ordinary debt collecting 
mechanism, that is, debt enforcement by way of summons followed by judgment and 
execution.126 These statements were, however, never considered as to their 
applicability within the ambit of the NCA and sequestration. The difference between 
these opposing devices is in particular considered by Westbrook et al,127 in which it 
is explained as follows: 
 
While debt enforcement has a strong and necessary relationship to 
insolvency proceedings, it has its own important and independent role to 
play in an economic system. Insolvency proceedings are not effective tools 
for debt collection as such. A collective proceeding is too cumbersome and 
expensive … to be useful for the purpose of forcing payment of a particular 
debt. 
 
Sharrock et al 128 remark that because insolvency law aims to ensure that creditors 
receive an equitable share of the debtor's estate, it is sometimes regarded as no 
more than an elaborate system of execution. In some legal systems, insolvency law 
is classified under civil procedure rather than under mercantile law, as in the South 
African system. But Sharrock129 submits that the notion that insolvency law is merely 
                                                 
124  See also Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 39 et seq for a discussion of this aspect. 
125  1911 AD 141 166. 
126  See for instance Jackson Logic and Limits Chp 1; Bertelsmann et al Mars para 1.1. 
127  Global View 9. 
128  Hockly's Insolvency Law 4. 
129  Hockly's Insolvency Law 4. 
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a system of execution is too simplistic because if it were so, sequestration would 
only affect the debtor's assets whereas it also affects the debtor personally, 
restricting his/her capacity and freedom to enter into contracts, to follow a chosen 
vocation, to litigate and to hold office. Sequestration also sometimes affects creditors 
in the sense that contribution may be levied from them in certain instances.  
 
It should further be noted that Part C of Chapter 6 of the NCA, which contains all the 
debt enforcement provisions, is entitled "Debt enforcement by judgment and 
repossession", thus allowing for an inference that the meaning of debt enforcement 
for purposes of the NCA should be interpreted restrictively in accordance with the 
aforesaid title. Sequestration nevertheless remains a drastic measure and there 
must be good reason to put the machinery of insolvency law into operation. It is also 
notable that Section 20(1) of the Insolvency Act, inter alia, stays pre-sequestration 
civil proceedings and executions. 
 
As with the Ford matter, this aspect once again illustrates that the legislator, when 
entertaining new legislation, does not always consider its effects on existing 
legislation with the result that it is left to the courts to consider its impact and 
application. 
 
6 Final observations and recommendations 
 
6.1 General 
 
Given the extensive nature of sequestration, it is submitted that it should rather be 
viewed as a sui generis mechanism that sets a collective procedure in motion aimed 
at administering an insolvent estate on behalf of the insolvent's group of creditors in 
order to achieve an equitable distribution of the insolvent's assets.130 As indicated, 
compulsory sequestration is not a debt enforcement procedure as envisaged by the 
NCA131 although one of its many effects, as with the case of voluntary surrender, is 
that the claims of creditors are paid as provided for by the Insolvency Act. It is further 
submitted that the fact that compulsory sequestration does not amount to debt 
                                                 
130  This procedure is set into motion by both compulsory sequestration and voluntary surrender. 
131  See 5 above. 
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enforcement and that sequestration is not barred in terms of the NCA does not, 
however, mean that the NCA cannot still have an influence on insolvency law. It 
should be noted that whereas voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration are 
both forms of sequestration, different considerations apply in each instance, which 
may have an influence on their possible interaction with the NCA.132 
 
6.2 Voluntary surrender 
 
In so far as voluntary surrender is concerned, it must be borne in mind that this is a 
debtor-initiated process in which the debtor bears the onus to prove that the statutory 
requirements, especially the very stringent advantage of creditors requirement, for its 
granting have been met. It is submitted that the question (as posed in Mutemeri with 
regard to compulsory sequestration) whether voluntary surrender amounts to debt 
enforcement, thereby triggering compliance with all the debt enforcement provisions 
of the NCA, does not arise.133 The reason therefore is clearly that debt enforcement 
is per se a creditor-induced procedure, whereas voluntary surrender is applied for on 
the debtor's initiative. 
 
Thus, it appears that within the realm of voluntary surrender, the significance that the 
NCA may have is in the sense that it may yield another procedure, namely debt 
review (resulting in an eventual voluntary rearrangement agreement or court-ordered 
debt restructuring) which might influence the issue of advantage of creditors. The 
court in the Ford matter also alluded to the consequences of determining that the 
credit agreements that formed part of the debt of the applicants might possibly have 
amounted to reckless credit.134 Interestingly, the court played a very active role in 
considering all possibilities even though no creditor objected to the applications as 
such. 
 
It is, however, submitted that the court in the Ford case did not elevate debt review 
as an additional prerequisite for sequestration by way of voluntary surrender but that, 
                                                 
132  See especially 3 and 4 above.  
133  This would give rise to the absurd situation that a debtor is required to send himself/herself a S 
129(1)(a) notice. See further 3 above. 
134  As to the consequences of a declaration of reckless credit, see 3.2 above. 
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given the fact that the advantage of creditors requirement is of pivotal importance in 
the exercise of a court's discretion whether to grant or refuse an application for 
voluntary surrender, the applicant-debtor for voluntary surrender who bears the onus 
to prove the very stringent requirement of advantage of creditors, should consider 
whether debt rearrangement or debt restructuring as a result of debt review might 
not be more advantageous than sequestration.135 It is submitted that although it is 
thus not formally required from a debtor to apply for debt review before making 
application for voluntary surrender, the possibility still exists that the court may, on 
finding or not being convinced that voluntary surrender will be to the advantage of 
creditors, apply Section 85 of the NCA. It is also possible that a creditor might 
intervene and argue that debt rearrangement or debt restructuring pursuant to debt 
review is more advantageous than the surrender of the debtor's estate. 
 
Where an application for voluntary surrender serves before the court, and the debt is 
mainly credit agreement debt, it is submitted that the debtor before bringing the 
application should nevertheless ensure that his/her debt situation cannot be dealt 
with more effectively and to the better advantage of creditors by means of the 
remedies available in the NCA. It is clear that such option would play a significant 
role in the exercise of the court's discretion, in particular with relation to the 
advantage of creditors requirement. It is further submitted that it is open to the court 
if it has doubts as to the more suitable remedy for purposes of advantage of 
creditors, to refer a debtor who had not been for debt review or had undergone a 
debt review that the court deems insufficient,136 to postpone the application sine die 
and to refer the matter in terms of Section 85(a) of the NCA.137 Such an approach 
might be the more cost effective route.  
                                                 
135  See 2 and 3 above. 
136  Eg because the possibility of reckless credit has not been considered, as happened in the Ford 
case. 
137  Where the debtor had indeed gone for a proper debt review and his/her credit agreement debt is 
being restructured in accordance with S 86(7)(c) of the NCA, and the court is satisfied that such 
debt review addressed both the aspects of over-indebtedness and reckless credit, but still finds 
that sequestration will not be to the advantage of creditors, the court should decline 
sequestration.  
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6.3 Compulsory sequestration 
 
With regard to compulsory sequestration, it is clear that its dynamics differ 
considerably from voluntary surrender. As such it is a creditor-induced procedure 
that, as a result of the creditor's lack of information regarding the debtor's factual 
financial position, carries a more relaxed onus, namely proof of "reason to believe" 
that compulsory sequestration will be to the advantage of creditors. Given the unique 
structure of compulsory sequestration, it has the effect that the sequestrating 
creditor, who in many cases relies on a Section 8(g) act of insolvency in terms of the 
Insolvency Act, will often not be apprised of the debtor's complete debt situation and 
will not be able to address a court on the possible better advantage yielded by debt 
rearrangement or debt restructuring as a result of debt review. Thus, it is submitted 
that it will be unreasonable for a court to require an applicant-creditor to address it on 
the possible advantages yielded by debt rearrangement or debt restructuring as a 
result of debt review unless the debtor has previously gone for debt review and 
made certain repayment proposals to such creditor. It should be borne in mind that a 
debt review is a voluntary procedure applied for by a debtor and that a creditor is not 
in a position to force a debtor to go for debt review so that the creditor will be 
apprised of information to submit to a court on the issue of advantage should the 
credit provider seek the sequestration of the debtor. Further, debt restructuring 
following upon a debt review requires the co-operation of all the debtor's credit 
providers. It will, however, be possible for a debtor (who has full knowledge of his/her 
own financial situation) or an intervening creditor to oppose the application for the 
debtor's compulsory sequestration and argue that debt rearrangement or 
restructuring pursuant to debt review may be more advantageous to creditors.138 It is 
submitted that a debtor (in the case of voluntary surrender or when opposing 
compulsory sequestration) or an intervening creditor should be armed with facts 
when approaching a court on the basis that debt rearrangement or debt restructuring 
as a result of debt review would yield the most advantage to creditors. Mere 
speculation that debt review might possibly yield better advantage than voluntary 
surrender or compulsory sequestration will not suffice. A court should not reject an 
                                                 
138  See 2.2 above. 
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application for voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration on a vague notion 
that debt review is the more suitable remedy in a particular instance but the court 
must clearly apply its mind judicially to such an option within the realm of the 
advantage principle whenever appropriate. 
 
It should further be remembered that debt review by a debt counsellor per se is a 
mere transitory procedure and does not yield advantage but that the advantage or 
lack thereof is to be found in the eventual debt rearrangement agreement or court-
ordered debt restructuring pursuant to debt review. 
 
As indicated,139 even where an applicant establishes a firm basis for sequestration, 
the court holds an ultimate discretion in granting the sequestration order in both 
voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration. Where a sequestration order is 
considered, the court must therefore decide whether sequestration will be the best 
solution under the circumstances when considering the advantage requirement. It is 
thus submitted that courts should not turn debt review as such into an additional 
statutory requirement for the reasons as stated above because it may add an 
additional expense to an already overburdened estate. At best, debt review should 
remain a factor for courts when exercising their discretion, such as considering 
administration as an alternative option to sequestration.  
 
It must also be remembered that both administration and debt review have their 
limitations in the sense that administration orders, although not restricted to one type 
of debt, may only be granted if the debt does not amount to more than R50 000 and 
also does not include in futuro debts, whilst debt review only applies to one type of 
debt, namely credit agreements as regulated by the NCA.140 It thus follows that the 
type of debt should also be taken into consideration in that where the debt does not 
amount to a credit agreement in terms of the NCA, or where the debtor has mixed 
debts, some of which are subject to the NCA and others that fall outside its ambit, 
debt review might not apply or only apply in a limited respect.  
 
                                                 
139  See 2.2 above. 
140  See 2.2 n 29 above. 
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Although the principles relating to the advantage of creditors requirement apply to 
both voluntary surrender and compulsory sequestration, it is nevertheless submitted 
that the courts must afford due consideration to the absence or presence of 
opposition by creditors to the granting of the order. It is submitted that this factor did 
not receive adequate attention in the Ford case. Courts must be mindful of the fact 
that sequestration applications take time and money and, especially where an 
application for voluntary surrender is turned down, that the estate will be further 
depleted of funds that could have been used to repay debt. In this sense, the 
question may be asked whether it was the best option for the court in the Ford matter 
to have denied the application for voluntary surrender and whether debt review 
would have solved the debt problems – especially since the creditors did not 
intervene to oppose the matter. It can be accepted that creditors, especially credit 
providers in terms of the NCA, probably have a considerable deal of information as 
to the financial position of their debtors and a decision not to oppose an application 
for voluntary surrender should thus carry some weight. 
 
The Mutemeri case dealt with compulsory sequestration and the granting of the 
sequestration order hinged on one extremely important question, namely whether an 
application for compulsory sequestration amounted to a civil procedure or civil suit in 
the form of debt enforcement.141 It is submitted that the court came to the correct 
conclusion in that it ruled that it did not. Suffice it to say that there is sufficient 
authority to support this conclusion of the court.  
 
Although a Section 129 notice was sent to the debtors in the Mutemeri case – 
apparently for the purposes of ordinary debt enforcement and to comply with the 
NCA in general in that regard – it is nevertheless submitted that a creditor who has 
reason to apply for sequestration of his/her consumer-debtor's estate relating to 
credit agreement debt is not obliged to send a Section 129 notice to such a debtor, 
since different principles are at play and because compulsory sequestration does not 
amount to debt enforcement in general or for the purposes of the NCA. 
 
                                                 
141  See S above. 
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It is further submitted that in the absence of a specific prohibitory provision in the 
NCA and as sequestration is not debt enforcement as envisaged by the NCA (thus 
not attracting the Section 88(3) bar), the estate of a debtor who is subject to debt 
review may also be sequestrated. This must clearly be the position, since debt 
review that amounts to a mere rescheduling of debt, leaving the debtor with a longer 
repayment period and an increase in the amount of debt, may not serve the purpose 
of an insolvent debtor who cannot really repay – even on such extended terms and 
conditions.  
 
6.4 Other observations 
 
Clearly, a debt situation is also not static and even after the debt rearrangement 
agreement or restructuring order, the financial position of such a debtor may further 
deteriorate. It is also clear that neither administration orders nor debt review will 
cover all debts in every and under all circumstances. These factors are thus 
indications that even existing debt-restructuring orders should not bar applications 
for sequestration, either by way of voluntary surrender or compulsory sequestration. 
The sequestration order should however only be granted if the relevant application 
meets the requirements in all respects and if the court is convinced that it does not 
amount to an abuse of procedure and if the advantage of creditors requirement in 
the given case is met to the satisfaction of the court. 
 
When considering an application for sequestration, courts must also remain mindful 
of the fact that a particular debtor may have debt in the form of credit agreements, as 
well as debt that does not comply with the definition of credit agreements. If this is 
the case, where the debtor applies for voluntary surrender and if the approach is 
followed that it is almost expected from an applicant-debtor first to apply for debt 
review, a question arises regarding the non-credit agreement debt that cannot form 
the subject of debt review in terms of the NCA. 
 
A new discretionary power that courts may exert over and above the general 
discretion of whether to grant a sequestration order is to be found in Section 85 of 
the NCA. Section 85 allows a court when considering a credit agreement to refer a 
matter for debt review. It is submitted that the Ford case is correct in its finding that a 
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court may also apply this provision when hearing an application for voluntary 
surrender when applicable. It is further submitted that the section may also be 
applied by a court that hears a matter for compulsory sequestration if its 
requirements are present – although this was not relevant in the Mutemeri judgment. 
In both such cases, a court may for instance postpone the hearing of the application 
for sequestration in order to get guidance from the report of a debt counsellor. 
Clearly, such a report may have a bearing on the discretion of the court when 
dealing with the advantage of creditors requirement.  
 
In the case of Mutemeri, and if it was for instance accepted that compulsory 
sequestration did amount to debt enforcement, it could have given rise to an 
anomaly that the applicant who relies on non-credit agreement debt could proceed 
without complying with the NCA but a credit provider in terms of the NCA would have 
to comply. If the first-mentioned applicant brought the application, the sequestration 
order would have included the credit agreement debt as well without a Section 129 
notice and compliance with any other relevant provisions of the NCA.142 
 
The Mutemeri judgment also sounded a warning to debt counsellors not to intervene 
in a pending sequestration application if they cannot prove a direct interest in the 
matter.  
 
It is finally submitted that within the context of sequestration of a debtor whose debt 
consists mainly of credit agreement debt, it thus appears that various scenarios may 
arise, namely: 
 
(a) The debtor may decide, without going for a formal debt review, that the debt 
relief afforded by the NCA will not alleviate his/her hopeless debt situation, and 
decide to apply for voluntary surrender. In such instance, if the court is not 
satisfied that voluntary surrender is the best option, it is submitted that 
depending on the circumstances of the case the court may need to decide to 
refuse the application for voluntary surrender or to postpone the application sine 
                                                 
142  See 4 and 5 above. 
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die and refer the debtor for formal debt review in accordance with its discretion in 
terms of Section 85 of the NCA.143 
 
(b) The debtor who has undergone a formal debt review finds himself/herself in the 
position that his/her credit providers do not want to agree to debt restructuring 
and will oppose his/her efforts to obtain same, or it is clear from the debt review 
that such debt restructuring will not be a viable option for addressing his/her debt 
situation. In such instance, if the court is not satisfied that voluntary surrender is 
the best option, it must refuse the application for voluntary surrender. If during 
the proceedings it transpired that the formal debt review that was conducted was 
defective in some way or another, for example that the possibility of reckless 
credit was not considered, it is submitted that the court could postpone the 
matter sine die pending the outcome of a referral to a debt counsellor to the 
court in accordance with the provisions of Section 85 of the NCA, if the court 
applied its mind to the effect that a possible finding of reckless credit may have 
on the debtor's total debt situation. The court also could have considered the 
question of reckless credit mero motu.  
 
(c) A creditor may wish to seek the compulsory sequestration of a debtor who has 
mainly credit agreement debt but who has not yet gone for debt review. In such 
instance, it cannot be reasonably expected from the applicant-creditor to address 
the court on the possibility that debt review may be a better option for the group 
of creditors than sequestration. It is not within the power of such creditor to force 
the debtor to go for debt review or to compel the other credit providers in respect 
of other credit agreement debt, to agree to a debt-restructuring plan. If the court 
is finally of the opinion that sequestration is not to the advantage of creditors, it is 
submitted that the sequestration order should not be granted. In general, it must 
be noted that other creditors or the debtor himself/herself may intervene at any 
stage of the proceedings prior to the granting of the final sequestration order to 
seek to convince the court that sequestration would not be the best option in the 
specific instance. 
 
                                                 
143  Court may seemingly also refer it to S 85, if it refuses the order for voluntary surrender.  
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(d) A creditor may wish to seek the sequestration of a debtor who has mainly credit 
agreement debt and who had already gone for debt review. Various situations 
may arise here: either the creditor rejected the debt repayment suggestions 
made on behalf of the debtor and the matter reached a dead end or the debt 
counsellor lodged an application to court which is still pending or the court made 
a debt-restructuring order despite the creditor's opposition. In such instance, 
there will be hard facts available on which a creditor will be able to indicate to the 
court why he/she is of opinion that sequestration is the better option, for example 
because the period for repayment and the monthly repayment amounts that are 
proposed are not viable or that the debtor failed to include all his/her credit 
agreement debt or that the debtor has, since the court made the debt 
rescheduling order or since the filing of a voluntary agreement between the 
parties,144 stopped making further payments. Where the creditor is able to 
convince the court that sequestration is the better option, the court should thus 
grant a sequestration order. 
 
Courts must however be cautioned, especially in those instances in which a debtor 
has not yet been for debt review against a "matter of course" exercise of its 
discretion in terms of Section 85 of the NCA where it has doubts regarding the 
possible advantage that debt relief in terms of the NCA may yield. 
                                                 
144  As per S 86(7)(b) of the NCA. 
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